Only a year ago, the African Growth & Opportunity Act (Agoa) looked rather like a trade agreement waiting for someone to switch off the lights.
Donald Trump was back in the White House, tariffs were once again the favoured instrument of US diplomacy, relations between Washington and Pretoria were deteriorating spectacularly and Agoa had briefly been allowed to expire. The broad assumption was that the 25-year-old arrangement belonged to an earlier, more generous American age.
What has happened over the past week looks increasingly like a dramatic reversal.
Last week the US House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly to extend Agoa to the end of 2028. President Trump signed the legislation shortly afterwards. More striking than the extension itself is who is arguing for it, and why.
Republican ways & means committee chair Jason Smith has become one of Agoa’s most energetic supporters. He is hardly misty-eyed about African development. Agoa, he argues, strengthens US national security, gives it access to Africa’s critical minerals and prevents China from dominating strategically important supply chains. After Trump signed the extension, Smith promised to keep pushing for a longer-term reauthorisation.
This is quite a sea change.
It’s worth dwelling on how emphatic the vote was. The House approved the extension 370 to 48, with Republicans backing it 193 to 19, and Democrats 176 to 29, an unusual result in a body that struggles to agree on the colour of the carpet. The Senate was similarly overwhelming, voting 90 to 6 for final passage.
This suggests Agoa has ceased to be a marginal programme vulnerable to whichever party happens to control Congress. It now has a bipartisan political constituency: Democrats see it through the prism of development and diplomatic engagement, and Republicans view it as a tool for countering China, securing critical minerals and building supply chains outside Beijing’s orbit. The motives differ, but the vote suggests the underlying policy has become remarkably durable.
Even Trump trade representative Jamieson Greer says Agoa should be modernised rather than abandoned. His version would demand more access for US companies and more reciprocity from African economies, which will undoubtedly create arguments later. But the administration is debating what the next Agoa should look like, rather than whether there should be one.
There may be some electoral calculation here too. Republicans are in considerable danger of losing the House in November. Getting Agoa safely across the line now avoids leaving a useful foreign policy instrument hanging in the congressional rafters during a change of control.
Consequently, the shortness of the extension should perhaps not be interpreted as a disappointment. South Africa and other African countries had wanted much longer certainty, potentially 10 or 15 years. Two years is obviously inadequate if you are trying to persuade somebody to build a factory whose payback period runs into the 2030s.
Yet Smith himself says the period to 2028 is intended to provide time to reform Agoa and pursue a longer extension. A ways & means hearing last week was already discussing a 10-year version.
There is therefore a reasonable possibility that 2028 will become a staging post rather than an expiry date. If Democrats take the House, that probability may increase rather than diminish because their support for Agoa is already entrenched.
For South Africa, unfortunately, the good news needs a very large caveat.
The first problem is that extending Agoa does not guarantee South Africa’s membership of it. Eligibility is reviewed annually and the 2027 review is already under way. The statutory criteria include the rule of law and political pluralism, but also US trade interests and whether beneficiary countries act contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests. In a recent paper, research firm Oxford Economics identifies South Africa as especially vulnerable, given the deterioration in relations with Washington.
The second problem is that Agoa status no longer necessarily means duty-free access in any practical sense.
South Africa has historically been one of Agoa’s largest beneficiaries. Oxford Economics estimates that the country accounted for about half of the $8.23bn in goods exported under Agoa in 2024, with vehicles particularly significant. But US automotive tariffs can sit on top of Agoa preferences, substantially reducing or eliminating the advantage.
The contradiction became more obvious in July, when the Trump administration imposed a 12.5% tariff on most goods from South Africa and a number of other countries over what Washington says are inadequate prohibitions on imports produced with forced labour.
So South Africa can theoretically enjoy preferential access under Agoa, while simultaneously paying additional tariffs imposed under entirely different laws.
There is a final irony. The sudden rediscovery of Africa by the US may have relatively little to do with Africa itself. Agoa has survived because it has been successfully translated into the language of Trump-era politics: minerals, supply chains and competition with Beijing.
The uncomfortable question is whether Washington wants South Africa to remain one of its principal beneficiaries.
